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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
CLARK EQUIP'MEN'T CREDIT
COR:PORATION, a corpor:a;tion
and CLARK EQUIPMENT
COMPANY, a corpora:ti on,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
CENTER, INC., 'and JOHN N.
GALANIS and DENA
GALANIS,
Defendants and App.ellants.
1

Case No. 9637

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF ·G~SE
'This was an action filed in the 'Third District
Court for Bait Lake County by the plaintiff corporations iagainst the appellants, Transport Equipment
Center, Inc., John N. Galan'is rand Dena G'al:anis,
and certain other defendants to re'cover upon a promissory note executed in favor of the plaintiff, Clark
Equipment Credit Corporation, by the appeUant,
Transport Equipment Center. This note was executed on or about November 23, 1959. The prayer
of the plaintiffs' complaint was for a judgment in
favor of Clark Equipment ·credit Corporation in the
sum of $104, 629.37, which included unpaid interest,
claimed to be due.
1
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The action was also brought by Clark Equipment Company to recover the sum of $3'5,300.2'5 for
trailer and trailer parts allegedly supplied to Transport Equipment Center, Inc., by the pFaintiff, Clark
Equipment Company, on open account during a
period when the appellant, ·Transport Equipment
Center, was Clark Equipment Oomp:any dealer in
Salt Lake City.
The action against the individual defendants
was base'd upon the execution by them of unconditional guarantees of the payment of the
note which was executed by Transport Equipment
Genter. In this connection the !appellants, John N.
Gal,'anis ·and Dena Gal'ani.s, signed guarantees of payment of the Note in 'the amount of one hundred per
cent '(1001o) of the amount of the note.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On December 7, 1'96'1, the plaintiff, Clark
Equipment Credit Corporation, filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment ~against the defendants in connection with their claim as it related to the Revolving Credit Agreement and the guarantees of the
individua1 defendants. (R. 156, 1 57).
1

1

1

Argumenlt on the Motion for Summary J udgment was heard before the Honora:ble Merrill C.
Faux, on Friday, Janu1ary 12, 19'6'2. Arguments of
counsel were heard for the respective sides and at
2
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the conclusion thereof the trial judge granted the
Motion for Summary Judgment resulting in the
filing of a Judgment against Transport Equipment
Center, Inc., John N. G·alanis and DenJa Galanis in
the sum of $110,9'27.36 which included the interest
and the Judgment was ·to accrue interest at the rate
of seven per cent (7%) per annum from the entry
thereof. The entry of Judgment was February 16,
1962 (R. '172, 173).
1

RELIEF SOU'GHT ON APPEAL
'The appellants seek reversal of the trial court's
order which resulted in Summary Judgment 1against
the parties appealing and for the referral by this
Court to the trial court for a tria~ on the merits
of the action.
STATEMEN·T OF FACTS
Transport Equipment Center, Inc., is :a Utah
corporation, which at all times m1aterial to this
action was engaged in the business of seUing, servicing, repairing and furnishing parts for trailers
used in over-fue-road hauling.
Transport Equipment Center, Inc., was a dealer
for the Brown-T~ailer Division of Clark Equipment
Company and operated as such pursuant to a ''Dealer Sales and Service Agreement" dated October 14,
1958 (R. 117-1'29).
_While operating as a dealer under the terms of
3
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this agreement, Transport Equipment Center sold
t~ailers, serviced and repaired them. Certain work
on trailers of the Brown Division make was done
by Transport Equipment Center pursuant to the
warranty provision of the dealer contract (R. 121).
This work was done at the request of the purchasers
of trarlers claiming defective manufacture. This resulted in a claim by Transport Equipment Center
again'st Clark Equipment Company as an off-set
to the open account claim by Clark Equipment Company against Transport Equipment Center (R. 85
and 139).
As 'a result of the fa:ilure or refusal of Clark
Equipment Company to make satisfactory adjustments of the accounts between it and Transpor1
Equipment Center over a long period of time, 'Transport Equipment Center became heavily indebted to
Clark Equipment Company in 1an amount in excess
of Transport Equipment cIa i m s against Clark
Equipment Company ('R. 2 and 19).
The indebtedness of ·Transport Equipment Center to Clark Equipment Company was furtller increased by reason of slow delivery of tra!lers 1and the
delivery of them butlt to improper or wrong specifications (R. 67). ·Thus, the unfavora;ble financial
position of Transport Equipment Center was worsened because of the refusal of Clark Equipment
Company to negotiate differences and failure to pay
4
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for warranty work. These failures required the use
of operating capital of Transport Equipment Center
to finance the items which Clark Equipment Company would not pay or negoti,ate ( R. 67).
Finally, by re!ason of the course f)f dealings between the Clark Equipment Company and 'Transport Equipment Center, the position of Transport
Equipment Center required the execution of the
"Revolving Credit Agree·ment " (R. 9'4-'104), the
Promissory Note and the Agreements of Guaranty
by the individual defendants.
Clark Equipment Credit Corpor\ation and Clark
Equipment Corporation instituted suit 1against the
defendants when the Revolving Credit Agreement
and the Promissory Note fell into default. The defendants asserted defenses as set forth 'in their ·Answer and particu1ar ly the Amended Answer setting
forth 'an affirm a,tive Fourth 'Defense as fdllows:
"As a further and affirmative defense, the answering defendants allege as follows:
1

'''1. That the conduct 'Of the plaintiff and
of its officers has been such that the defendants have been subjected to economi~ compulsion and duress by the deliberate acts of
the plaintiff.
"2. That because of the e co n om i c
threats, compul'sion and duress to which the
defendants have been subjected as individuals
and as officers of Transport Equipment Center they have been required, as individuals
5
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and officers, against their w}lls inquced an_d
required to sign an executed revolving credit
!agreement' referred to in plaintiffs' complai~t,
and were further induced, coerced and required by threats amounting to economic compulsion :and duress to ·sign guarantees of payment.
"3. That the acts and conduct of the
plaintiff which have subjected the defendants
to coersion, compulsion and duress 1as herein
alleged :are particularly set forth as follows:
"(a) The plaintiff represented to the
defendants that the revolving credit agreement or refinancing plan into which the defendants entered would be such as to permit
short term borrowing from local filllancial institutions by Transport Equipment Center and
in truth and in fact such short term borrowing was specifically pohibited and that the
plaintiff and its officers well knew that such
short term borrowing was prohibited.
"(b) That the slow delivery of trailers
by the plaintiff 1and the delivery of trailers
built to improper and wrong specifications
brought Transport Equipment Center into
such financial condition that it became necessary to refinance the business and that by
reason of this the defendants were forced, required and coerced into executing the 'revolving credit agreement' and the contracts of
guarantee.
" (c) The plaintif deliberately refused
to negotiate claims which it had against
Transport Equipment Center, the defendants,
and ctaims which the defendants had against
the plain tiff and further refused to pay the
1

6
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defendant for warranty work done for the
Brown Division of the plaintiff company.
That said warranty work had to be paid for
from operating capital of the defendant which
worsened and deteriorated its financia'l condition to the extent that the defendants were
forced to enter into the 'revolving credit
agreement' 'and the agreement of gua~antee.
" (d) That the revolving credit agreement and the agreements of guarantee were
entered in to by reason of the threats of the
plaintiff that the only altern1a:tive would be
a management contract by which the plaintiffs would take over the business and the
defendant, John Galanis, could be arbitrarily
removed from the business 1after six ( 6)
months at the sole and unilateral decision of
the plaintiff.
" (e) The plain tiff refused to permit
the defendants to handle service and sell other
makes of trarlers even though the plain tiff
could not and would not supply the defendants
with a complete line of trailer equipment.
''(f) That the plaintiff deliberately delayed the negotiation of settlement of claims
by the plaintif against the defendant and the
defendants against the plain tiff and by reason
of such delay there was a forced deterioration
of the financial position of the defendant,
Transport Equipment Center, which could
not be avoided by the defendants bringing
the defendants to the point where they were
compelled to 1accede to the plaintiffs' requirements by executing the 'revolving credit agreement' and the agreements of guarantee.
''By reason of the threats, economic com7
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pulsion and duress practiced by the plaintiff
upon the defendants, the execution of therevolving credit agreement and the ~~reements
of gua~an tee were not free and vohtional acts
of the defendants or any of them, and any
liability therefore of the defendants should
be a voided and the plain tiffs take nothing by
reason of said agreements 1against any of
these answering defendants." (R 66-68).
A summary Judgment was entered in favor
of the plaintiffs January 16, 1962 (R. 172-173),
without an opportunity to produce any testimony
in support of this defense or other defenses asserted.
'The individUJal defendants, John N. G·al'anis
and Dena Galanis, his wife, are judgment creditors
only because of the insistence of Clark Equipment
Credit Company that these persons, and others, sign
agreements guaranteeing the repayment of Transport Equipment Company's note (R. 67-68).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIA'L COURT E R R E D IN GRANTING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR S'UMMARY JUDGMENT
FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
A. THE PLAINTIFF CORPORATIONS ARE REPRESENTED BY THE SAME PERSON AND THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES ASSERTED ARE VALID AS
AGAINST BOTH.
B. THE DRASTIC DECISION OF SUMMARY
J UDGMENT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE RECORD
AND DEPRIVED DEFENDANTS OF THE RIGHT TO
SUBMIT EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THEIR DEFENSES.
1

8
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIA·L COURT E R R E D IN GRANTING
PLAINTI-FFS' MOTION FOR SUM'MARY JUDGMENT
FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
A. THE PLAIN'TIFF COR'PORATI'ONS ARE REPRESENTED BY THE SAME PERSON AND THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES ASSERTED ARE VALID AS
AGAINST BOTH.

The Motion for Summary Judgment was argued to the trial judge January 1'2, 19·6'2. Extensive
oral argument was m1ade by counse1 and the Court
was referred to the pleadings and certain depositions were examined in the course of argument.
Although there is no transcript of the oral
colloquy 'between Court and counsel, i't appeared
that the learned tr]al judge granted the Motion for
Summary Judgment upon the theory that Cl'ark
Equipment Company, !and Clark Equipment Credit
Corporation were two distinct and separate entities.
It further appeared tha't the Court felt 'that defenses !asserted against Cl'ark Equipment Company
were not properly asserta;ble against Cl'ark Equipment Credit Co~poration.
'This conclusion of the trial ·court would leave
Clark Equipment Credit Corporation free and untouched by any of the defenses interposed against
Clark Equipment Corpo~a,tion.
No motion or other procedural device was ever
m'ade or suggested by Clark Equipment Company
9
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attacking the validity of the legal theory of the defense of economic compulsion or duress.
On Motion for Summary Judgment, extensive
reference was made to the deposition of John Wood,
an officer of both Clark Equipment Company and
Clark Equipment Credit Corporation. For purposes
of the argument the deposition of John Wood was
published. Nothing coUld so graphically demonstrate
the complete identity of the two corporations or the
fact that an officer of both corporations represented
them in a:l1 dealings with Transport Equ'ipment than
the deposition of Mr. John R. Wood. In support of
this contention, the testimony of Mr. Wood on deposition is set forth 'as follows :
"Q What is your occupation, Mr.
Wood?
"A Vice President and Treasurer of
Clark Equipment Company. President of
Clark Equipment Credit Corporation.
"Q How long have you been president
of Clark Equipment Credit Corporation?
"A During 1961. Prior to that time I
was Vice President ·and Treasurer.
"Q For what length of time were you
Vice Pres'ident and Treasurer of Clark Equipment Credit Corporation?
"A Since its inception in June of 19'54.
"Q Is Clark Equipment Credit Corporation a Michigan corporation?
"A Yes.
10
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"Q. Is Clark Equipment Company a
Michigan corporation?
"A Yes.
"Q Is Clark Equipment Credit Corporation a wholly owned subsidiary of Clark
Equipment Company?
'''A Yes.
"Q Are you a Director of Clark Equipment Credit Corporation?
'I'A Yes.
"Q For what length of time have you
been 1a Director of that corporation?
"'A Since its inception.
''Q Who are the other Directors of
Clark Equipment Credit Corporation?
"A All directors are also officers of
Clark Equipment Company. Do you want their
names?
''Q Are alt Directors of Clark Equipment Credit Corporation 1a1so Directors of
Clark Equipment Company?
"A No.
"Q We had better have their names,
then. Tell me the names of the Directors of
Clark Equipment Credit Corporation?
'''A George Spatta, Walter Shirmer, Myself, Clarence K'illebrew, Burt Phillips, J. F.
Bechtel.
"Q There are six Directors?
"A Yes sir.
''Q Could you give me the names of the
Directors of Clark Equipment Company?
11
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''A There are twenty of them. They are
all published.
'''Q Let me get at it this wa:y" Is George
Spatta a Director of Clark Equipment CompMy?
"A Yes.
"Q Is Mr. Shirmer a Director of Clark
Equipment Company?
"Q Of course you were a Director of
Clark Equipment Company?
'''A Yes.
'''Q And Mr. Killebrew is ~a Director of
Clark Equipment Company?
''A Yes.
"Q Of the six directors of Clark Equipment Credit Corporation, four, or a majority
of the Board, are also Directors of Clark
Equipment Company?
'''A Yes sir.
'''Q Has that been the situation since
C1ark Equipment Credit Corpom.tion was organized?
"A No sir.
''Q Has Clark Equipment Company had
control of the Board of Directors of Clark
Equipment Credit Corporation since organization?
''A Since Clark Equipment Company
owns 100 per cent of the outstanding stock
of Clark Equipll_len t Credit Oorpol'lation in non
legal language 1t must control the Directors.
"Q The Board as well as ''A Who votes for the Board of Direc12
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tors except the stockholders, and if the stockholders vote for the Board of Directors "Q I don't want to argue with you.
"A You use words I can't answer. You
said 'control'.
"MR. ROE : Will you tell me what
you mean by 'control'?
''Q Have at least f:our of the Directors
of Clark Equipment Credit Corporation since
the organization of that company also been
Directors of Clark Equipment Company?
"A No.
"Q Who were the original Directors of
Clark Equipment Credit Corpo~ation?
"A These same men, excepting that
Davies was substituted for Phillips, and that
is the only difference.
''Q What is Davies full name?
"A Robert H. Davies. He was a Vice
President of Clark Equipment Company, but
not 1a director.
''Q All right, That clears it up, I think.
'''Are the executive offices of Clark Equipment
Credit Corporation in the same building as
the executive offices of Clark Equipment Company?
"A Yes.
''Q Is there any physical division of the
facilities of the Equipment Company as contrasted with the Credit Gorpo~a:tion?
''A Yes.
"Q Do the personnel of the Equipment
Company occupy different space?
13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"A Yes.
"Q Are legal counsel the same for the
two companies?
"A Yes.
"Q Are the accountants the same for
the two companies?
'''A Yes.
I am going to correct the statement
on the legal counsel. The answer is 'No' outside legal counsel.
"Q Is the house counsel the same for the
two companies?
"A Yes.
"Q Who is that?
"A Whoever is in the employ of the
company at the time.
''Q Who is it now?
''A Who is it now?
"Q Who is it now?
"A David L. Howel'l.
"Q Only Mr. Howell?
''A And assistants.
''Q Does he have an assistant?
"A Many assistants.
"Q Mr. Howell and his staff perform
house counsel services for both the Clark
Equipment Company and the Clark Equipment Credit Corporation?
'''A Yes sir.
"Q For what length of time has that
been true?
14
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"A Since the inception of-the company.
That applies to the man who is in the position
of house counsel, not to Mr. Howell.
"Q Are you a stockholder of Cla:rk
Equipment Company, Mr. Wood?
"A Yes sir.
''Q Have you been a stockholder at all
times materi!a;l 'to this lawsuit?
"A Yes.

* * *
"Q Has there been some single person
in Transport Equipment Company and Transport Equipment Credit Corporation who h:as
heen in charge of this T.E.C. situation, Mr.
Wood?
"A Yes.
"Q Who is that person?
"'A John Galanis.
'''Q I am speaking of representative or
person representing Cla:rk Equipment Company"A Oh.
'"Q - and Clark Equipment Credit
Corporation. Has there been some person that
the two companies have designated as the person in charge of this situation?
''A I am responsible ror all of the credit
activities of Clark Equipment Company, and
have been all during the time of the relationship of Clark Equipment Company and Clark
Credit Corporation with T.E.C.
''Q It would be correct, then" A I want to finish my 'Statement.
15
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''Q Excuse me.
"A - and from the period of the 'inception of the relationship with T.E.C., w~ich
was the date of 'acquisition of Brown Tra1ler
Company by Clark Equipment Com~any, I
participated with others in the relationship
with T.E.C. on other than financial matters.
"And in the period from May 25, approximrately, 1959, until September 25, 1960,
approximately, I was fully responsible for the
relationship on all matters with T.E.C. as
far as the sales activity, and other relationships were concerned.''
Since a corpor.ation exists as a legal entity by
statutory fiat, it can act only through its officers
and agents. Therefore, knowledge of officers and
agents who are acting within the scope of the authority .conferred upon them by the corporation is imputed to the corporation. Knox vs. First Security
Bank of Utah, 206 F. 2d 823 (lOth Cir., Utah) ;
Bergeson vs. Life Insurance Corporation of America, '265 F. 2d '227 (10th Cir., Utah) ; Mary Jane
Stevens Company vs. First National Building Company, '89 ·utah 456, 57 P. 2d 1099.
'This prin~ip'le also finds 'application in those
situations where two corporations have a common
officer or agent as in the instant case.
3 Fletcher's Cyclopedia Corporations, Section
790, Pages 20-26:
". . . the gene:rlal rule is well established
that a corporation is charged with construc16
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tive knowledge, regardless of its actual knowledge, of any material f!aets of which its officer or agents receives notice or 1aequires
knowledge while acting in the course of his
employment within the scope of h'is authority,
even though the officer or agent does not in
fact communicate his know ledge 'to the corporation (citing numerous case's.)"

* * *
'''Where the officers and agents of two
corporations are identical, each one is chargeable with notice of everything that ~omes to
the knowledge of the common officers."
In further elaboration of this principle the following is stated from the 'same source at pages
131-132:
"The rule that if one is agent of both
parties to a transaction and tHis is known and
consented to, noUce to him is noti ce to both
~df them if it swould be notice if the agent
represented such one alone, is applied to agents
of corporations ... Where two corporations
have interlocking and common management,
and one of them procures the property of a
third party by fraud, the other ~orporation
is charged with the notice, and if it takes the
property or its proceeds, it is chargeable with
the value thereof." (Citing cases)
1

In the present case, the defendant set up defenses against Clark Equipment Credit Comrp!any,
as outlined above, which defenses arose by reason
of its dealings with Mr. Wood, who was a common
officer in the Clark Equipment Credit Company land
1

17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Clark Equipment Company. He was authorized by
both companies to handle all transactions with defendants, T~ansport Equipment Center and Galanis.
Thus, Mr. Wood's dealings with the Transport
Equipment Center on behalf of the Clark Equipment
Company and the Clark Equipment Credit Corporation were inter-related and in fact consumm ated in
the same series of negotiations. Mr. Wood was specifically authorized to supervise all matters of credit
in wh'ich defendants were involved with Clark Equipment Company and the Clark Equipment Credit
Company. The Clark Equipment Credit Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of Olark Equipment Company. Four of the six directors of the
Credit Company are also on the Board of Directors
of the Equrpment Company.
'The concept of charging two corporations with
knowledge received by a common officer has received
the endorsement of this Court in the case of Utah
Bond and Share Company vs. Chappel, et al., 68
Utah 5'30, 5·36, 2'51 P. 354:
~'!Two corporations may be so closely affiliated in business that one is a mere agent
or instrumentality of the other. In such case,
the law of agency would apply and the knowledge of the ·agent, within the scope of its authority, would be binding upon its principal."
It seems obvious that any knowledge which Mr.
Wood acquired as an officer and agent of Clark
Equipment Company is chargeable to the Clark
1

18
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Equipment Credit Company for purposes of this
suit. In fact, Mr. Wood, as agent and officer of
Clark Equipment Company, di~ctated the terms upon
which settlement of the differences between thJat
company and Transport Equipment Center would
be effected. It was upon his insistence that a Promissory Note to Clark Equipment Credit Corporation,
rather than the Equipment Company, was issued by
defendants. The note given represented the agreed
indebtedness as of that date to the Equipment Com,pany. Any dealings by defendants wi'th the Clark
Equipment Credit Corporation were for the convenience of the Equipment Company and to assist
Mr. Wood. Therefore, any notice or kn'Owledge with
reference to defenses available to Transport Equipment Center against Clark 'Equipment Company are
similarly avai1·able against the Credit Corporation
because of the dual capacity in wHich Mr. Wood
acted at the time the Promissory Note in que'Stion
here was negoti!ated. Because identical knoWledge
is chargeable to Clark Equipment Credit Corporation as was in possession of the Equipment Company, through their common officer and agent, 'Mr.
Wood, the Credit Corporation claim is subject
to all of the defenses whi1ch were available
against the Clark Equipment Company. It is contrary to conscience and equity under the facts of
this case to permit Clark Equipment Credit Corpor19
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ation to draw a shroud about itself and remain immune from legal defenses which the defendants have
against its parent company.
B.

THE

DRASTIC

DECISION

OF SUMMARY

J UDGMENT W~S NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE RECORD
1

AND DEPRIVED DEFENDANTS OF THE RIGHT TO
SUBMIT EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THEIR DEFENSES.

For purposes of considering the Motion for
Summary Judgment the allegations respecting the
use of coercion and duress 'by the defendant, Cl1ark
Equipment Company, must be considered as true.
As this court observed in Brandt vs. Springville
Banking Company, 10 Utah 2d 3'50, 3'53 P. 2d 460,
"We are obEged to review the record in
the light most favorable to the party against
whom the motion w.as granted."
As was pdinted out in the argument in support of sub-point A, these acts are chargeable
against Clark Equipment Credit Corporation as well
as Clark Equipment Company.
This being the case, certainly there existed a
genuine and material issue of fact to be decided.
That the pleadings presented such a material question of fact was not at any time even questioned by
the plaintiff, Clark Equipment Company.
It is axiomatic that the remedy of summary
judgment 'is a stringent and drastic one which the
courts will grant reluctantly and with extreme care.
An excellent statement by this court of that
1
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doctrine is found in Bullock vs. Deser.et Dodge Truck
Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 'P. '2d ·5'5'9.
Respecting the summary judgment p~oposition,
Mr. J ustiee Wiade U'sed this language :
"A summary judgment must be supported by evidence, adm'issions and inference
when viewed in the light most favorable to
the loser shows that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to 1a judgment as a matter
of 'law. Sueh showing must include a1l reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given
a trial, produce evidenee which would reasonrubly sustain a judgment 'in hi's favor."
We urgently submit that under the facts alleged
in the pleadings 'in this ·case t:hJat 1issue'S were framed
in the interests of justice require'd a trial :with respect to them.
·A ca·se similar to the one at bar in many respects 'is Holzman vs. Bar~ett, a case decided by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, reported at 192
F. 2d 113.
'This case was an !a;ction by the plaintiff for
money damages based upon a claim that the several
defendants, including the Attorney General of Illinoi's, had conspired to make the plaintiff transfer
to two of the plaintiffs his control of the stock in
an insurance company.
The complaint al'leged that the Attorney General had threatened to appoint a rehabilitator for
21
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the insurance company if the p~aintiff refused to
accede to the .dema:dds of defendants.
The trial court gran ted a 'Motion for Summary
Judgment in favor of the defendants and against
plaintiff, !and this decision was rever·sed by the
Seventh Circuit Court.
Certain affidavits were submitted by both par~ies, by the defendants in support of their Motion for
Summary Judgment, and by the plaintiff in support of what was des·cribed as a Motion to Strike
the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
'These raffidavits related to the ·contentions of the
parties respecting whether the duress and coercion
claimed did, in fact, exi'st. The court in its discussion quoted a portion of the opinion of Guardwn
Trust Company vs. M.eyer, 19 F. 2d 186, as follows:
-"Whether such duress exists as to a particular transaction is !a matter of fact. There
the suit was upon notes given by the defendant
in lieu of other notes which had been obtained
from him by duress. One of the isisues in the
case was whether the defendant by the execution of the renewal note's had ratified the
original. The court in discussing this question
stated at 19 F. 2d 1'93, 'the same fear of
prosecution that compefled the execution of
the note's continued as a matter of course;
the defendant in error so testified, and reason
supports his testimony. All his subsequent
statements are readily attributable to this
mental state.' "
'The f!act situation in that case appears very
22
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similar to the ones set forth by the allegations of
the defendants in this case.
In the Seventh Circuit opinion in the Rolzroon
vs. Barrett case, concludes with this language :
"In view of what we have sa:id, we think
that there was a genuine issue !as to a material fact, that 'is, whether the plaintiff, at
the time of the execution of the 1'949 agreements was acting under duress imposed by
the defendants, and that the defendants Motion for Summary Judgment Wlas erroneous'ly
allowe'd. The legal issues argued here as to
the interpretation and effect to be given the
'1948 agreements rest upon the premise that
there was no issue of duress raised re~ative
to their execution. The pertinency of these
issues of law is, therefore, dependent upon a
decision of the factual issue favorable to the
defendants."
1

Certainly a proper and just resolution of the
problem posed by the instant case required a determination of the factual issues raised by the defenses
and by the re'ception of evidence respecting them.
The trial court's action, therefore, in gr1anting the
Motion for Summary Judgment improperly denied
the defendants the right to have the validity of their
defenses tried out.
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CONCLUSION
It is therefore respeetfully submitted that the
tria'l court's Summary Judgment 'Should be reversed
and the matter 'sent back to the tria1 court for a
hearing and trial upon the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR. and
MERLIN R. LYBBERT
Attorneys for Appellants
515 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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